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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show the vitality of Moroccan 
associationism in two identity vindications - sexual (women) and ethnical 
(Amazigh). These vindications have clearly materialized in the politics of the 
State at the beginning of the 21st century: women obtained a Family Code 
reform and the Amazighs some measures aimed at protecting their culture. 
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Introduction 
In Moroccan society, as in other Maghreb countries, there have been areas 
where associative movements concerning sexual (women) and ethnical 
(Amazigh) identity have appeared and crystallized, especially after the arrival of  
colonial Independence. The objective of this paper is to describe the vitality and 
dynamism of this country and also to analyze how the collective vindications 
have materialized politically in the Moroccan State.  
In the case of women, they used the associations to favour their legal 
vindications (Daoud 1993). The difference in opinion regarding the changes to 
be made in the law during the 80s and 90s, and the coverage given by the 
mass media openly siding with one option or the other, propitiated the 
appearance of two kinds of feminism: Islamicizing feminism and emancipatory 
feminism. The former obtained a clear victory with the recent reform of the 
                                                          
1 Article published in: Y. Aixelà (2007), “Las ciudades marroquíes en las reivindicaciones 
étnicas y de sexo: mujeres y feminismos, beréberes y visibilidad sociopolítica", in: O. Aouad 
Lahrech y F. Benlabbah (eds.): Le Maroc et l’Espagne. Cinquante ans de cooperation, Rabat: 
Instituto de Estudios Hispano-Lusos,  pp.133-146. 
Some of the arguments presented in this text were discussed at the round-table discussion of 
the International Course organized by Oumama Ouad and Fatiha Benlabbah at the Universidad 
Internacional Menendez Pidal (Santander) between 28 and 30 August 2006 “España y 





Mudawana (Family Code) in 20042.  
In the case of the Amazighs, they have become more socially visible in 
recent years (Goodman 2004, Venema and Mguild 2003). The State has 
recently recognized their ethnic specificity, and this recognition has resulted in 
promotion of the Amazigh language, which is now being used in a few schools, 
the support of some of the media and the creation of an institution to preserve 
and promote this culture, the Institut Royale de la Culture Amazighe (Aixelà and 
Giralt 2005). As we will see, this strong Amazigh movement is sowing the seeds 
of small cultural associations in urban and rural areas throughout the country. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the vindications of both types of 
associations have been influenced and strengthened by such elements as: 
- The associative vitality of the postcolonial period, 
- The influence of other Maghrebian networks, 
- The influence of small social networks and associations 
established in Europe, and 
- The international pressure of different organizations. 
 
Women and feminisms 
The historical invisibility of women in the politic arena 
The presence and visibility of many women in the associative and 
sociopolitical Moroccan sphere nowadays illustrates the important 
transformation that the country has undergone in the 20th century3. 
Their historical invisibility in the political sphere had been wrongly related to 
women’s incapacity to take part in the decisions of the family group and, by 
extension, of society as a whole. In fact, this perception and interpretation of the 
nonexistent mobility and social influence of Moroccan women, assumed also by 
some Moroccans and Europeans, was perceivable at the end of the 19th 
century and has continued up to the present day. 
On the one hand, for travelers in the 19th century and colonizers of the 20th 
                                                          
2 Aixelà “The Mudawwana and the Koranic Law. The substantial Changes to the Moroccan 
Family Law”, Multilingual Matters (Special Issue). In press.  





century, the situation of inferiority and subordination of women in Morocco was 
proof of the cultural backwardness of the country, and this opinion is still held 
by numerous Europeans nowadays4. In the opinion of the majority this situation 
was provoked by an Islam that was characterized by patriarchal values 
(discourse influenced by the precursory work of Robertson-Smith). 
On the other hand, for the political leaders and Moroccans that fought for  
Independence (and also for different political parties in the postcolonial period), 
women were one of the triggers that could activate the socioeconomic take off 
of the country5, an idea that would be accompanied by sociopolitical reforms 
but that, in reality, was only partially fulfilled6. 
                                                          
Despite these historical positions on women’s status in Morocco, the feminine 
and feminist associations have recently obtained changes in the law that 
ameliorates their legal situation (obviously with the help of the population and 
some political parties). 
 
The Moroccan Law: the aim of Feminine and Feminist Associations 
Initially, in the 50s, the associative women’s movements were more feminine 
than feminist: their objectives were to do charity work, guarantee education for 
girls, and control early marriage (for example, the association Ijwan as-Safa).  
Then, in the late 60s, a part of the feminine associationism declared itself 
4 For example, travellers of the XIX century such as Domènec Badia i Leblich (1803-5), 
Estébanez Calderón (1844), Joaquin Gatell (1862), Cristóbal Benítez (1878) and Enrique 
D’Almonte (1906). Also, some ethnologists of French legal sociology at the end of the XIX 
century and beginning of the XX century such as C. Sabatier, M. E. Mercier, A. Hanoteau, A. 
Letourneux, G. Salmon, L. Milliot, A. M. Goichon, M. Morand, M. Gaudry, R. Vigier, and G. 
Laoust-Chartréaux. All of them repeated constantly the backwardness discourse of the 
Maghreb centered on women's status. For more information, see Martín Corrales (2002) and 
Aixelà (2000). 
5 Lalla Aisha, daughter of Mohamed V and sister of Hassan II (Mohamed VI's father), became 
the symbol of Muslim women in the colonial period. During a protest speech of her father's in 
Tangier on 11 April 1947 she removed her veil and addressed the audience in three different 
languages on the necessity of educating women for the rebirth of Morocco. This made a great 
impression throughout the Arab world: “our sultan, may God bless him...hopes that all women 
will persevere in their education. They are the proof of our rebirth and the driving force behind 
our reform programme “ (Daoud, 1993:250). 
6 Proof of this was the fact that the Family Code, Mudawana, was passed between 1957 and 
1858. Despite the proposals put forward by various feminine associations, the code maintained 
the dependence of women within the family sphere. Timid reforms were made to the Mudawana 
in 1993 during Hassan II's reign, but it was not until 2004 when greater amendments were 





feminist and claimed that the priority was to transform the Family Code, 
Mudawana. This code bound women within the family sphere where they were 
dependent upon their masculine relatives. This demand for changes in the law 
opened the debate on the limits of feminine liberation, and this led to the 
breakdown of the previous associative consensus. The split in feminine 
associationism provoked the emergence of feminist associative movements. 
Thus, emerged the Progressist Union of Moroccan Women (1962), an 
organization that defended feminine emancipation with a renewed message, 
less identified with the Islamic conception of women. To compensate for the 
important influence of this association, another organization was created, 
closely related to the monarchy and the State, called the National Union of 
Moroccan Women (1969). This second association also defended the need for 
some changes to be made in the feminine reality, but based on different kinds 
of concepts such as authenticity or difference. This association's intention was 
to define the limits of the legal transformations (Waterbury, 1975).  
At this point, the discourses on the feminine question in Morocco split into 
two major feminist sections, with divergent social aims: on the one hand,  
Islamicizing feminism and, on the other, emancipatory feminism. There were  
important differences in their contents but both converged in the kind of 
structures used to carry on their work (associations), the methodology 
(meetings and debates) and the element that should be preserved or 
transformed (the legal frame). 
The vindications of the two types of feminists, apparently either in favor or 
against the Islamic sociolegal system, proposed the affirmation of women within 
the place reserved for them in the family structure (Islamicizing feminism) or  
renunciation of those priority tasks reserved for them in the family 
(emancipatory feminism). This was the reason why their vindications never tried 
to affirm or negate their respect for Islam (despite the difference in their 
ideological construction) but accepts or rejects an authenticity given by kinship 
and transmitted by gender (Aixelà 2000). 
 






Islamicizing feminists constructed a discourse on their feminine identity 
affirmation with the support of two criteria: the difference between the sexes 
and cultural authenticity, a fact that allowed them to defend women as wives 
and mothers. These movements, like a great part of Moroccan society, 
considered that the changes in the feminine status would profoundly change the 
cultural specificity of Islam. In their opinion, Islam gave society: 1) a sex identity 
with a sexual division of activities based on complementariness; 2) a solid 
religious basis; 3) a complete socio-legal code. The objective of Islamicizing 
feminism was the affirmation of women in Islam and it used the feminist 
vindication to defend a femininity established within the private and family 
sphere. The main objective was to preserve Muslim society (Aixelà 2002b).  
The veil would have a special symbolism: it made Islam visible, it manifested 
a political opinion, it was a social strategy of vindication, and it implied a specific 
socialization mode. The veil was the symbol of sociopolitical liberation, the way 
to express the affirmation of one's own identity7. 
On the contrary, the emancipatory feminists assumed that Moroccan women 
had to be liberated from the “patriarchal society”. Their vindications were based 
on the concept of equality that allowed them to discuss all the aspects that 
potentially discriminated women in the labor market, in the political sphere or in 
family life. This type of feminism founded their vindications in the well-known 
universal women rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The main objective of emancipatory feminism was to review and change 
the daily life of Moroccan women and to liberate them from their historical 
subordination. For this, they took as their base “sexual equality”, a concept that 
rejected feminine discrimination, and based their emancipatory discourse on the 
concepts “democracy” and “citizenship”. The proposal brought them into conflict 
with the State and also with the other feminist sectors. The emancipatory sector 
considered that the State had broken its post colonial promise of feminine 
emancipation, and that the other feminist movements had wrongly interpreted 
                                                          
7 For more information about the veil debate, consult Lie & Vogt (2003), El Guindi (1999), 





Islam. Emancipatory feminism also lacked the complicity of society as a whole 
because a great part of the population considered that some transformations in 
women's status would imply social changes in the Islamic model. This explains 
why these associations fought alone, without the support of the State or the 
society (Aixelà 2002b). 
 
Moroccan feminism since the profound reform of Mudawana in 2004. 
The Islamist silence 
The expansion of Islamism in the 70s influenced the proposals made by the 
feminist associative organizations (Zeghal 2006, Charrad 2001, Daoud 1993, 
Garon 2004). The Islamists had included women in their discourses of Islamic 
authenticity, and made clear their position on the controversy surrounding 
whether or not the Family Codes should be amended. This attitude provoked 
the emergence of a socio-cultural discourse that was impossible to dissociate 
from a specific gender construction. We can see this in other countries like 
Saudi Arabia or Algeria8. Khalidi and Tucker (1996:12) pointed out that “The 
Quran, hadith, and shari’a, then, provide a textual basis for understanding the 
Islamic view of gender... There is no one orthodox version of gender in Islam, a 
reality well reflected in the debates of the Arab world today about what, exactly, 
Islam prescribes as far as gender difference is concerned. Further complicating 
the discourse about gender in recent years has been the emergence of Islamist 
movements in the political scene of the region… they tend to subscribe to a 
restrictive view of women’s activities”. In fact, an Islamist agenda existed 
centered on women’s reality as Haddad and Smith (1996:137) pointed out: 
“Islamism, often called political Islam, has clearly placed the issue of the roles 
and rights of women at the center of its agenda. The rhetoric of Islamist 
teaching, speaking, and writing makes it abundantly clear that the ways in which 
women act, dress and comport themselves are crucial in the reconstitution of a 
                                                          
8 The Saudi Arabian case is well synthesized by M. Yamani (2000) and Raphaeli (2005). For 
the Algerian case, Turshen (2004:130) said that “With the end of the worst of the violence and 
as the Islamist threat subsides, Algerian women are emerging from a difficult period and 
feminists are again mobilizing to reform the Family Code”. For more Algerian information, read 





new and authentically Islamic society… Secularist and liberal Muslims tend to 
agree with the Western perception that Islamist positions in regard to women 
are regressive and represent a significant loss of rights gains for women 
through the hard-fought battles of the twentieth century”. 
With these antecedents, the 2004 Reform of the Mudawana, although 
endorsed by all the political parties, took four years to materialize (López 
Enamorado 2004). When it was finally approved, king Mohamed VI obtained the 
agreement of all the political forces in an effort to share the political risks and 
seek a global engagement with Moroccan society. In this way, he counteracted 
the strong social pressure and mobilization of the population in 2001 (the two 
big public demonstrations held in Rabat and Casablanca)9. 
This controversy allows us to observe some of the keys that explain the 
historical difficulties of Moroccans in making a profound reform of the 
Mudawana -and also of other Family Codes in the Arabic-Muslim world-: 
historically there existed an identification between “Muslim women” and ”Muslim 
culture”.  
Undoubtedly, the political identifications established in cultural identity terms 
had put the continuity of Islam in the hands of a nationalistic and conservative 
politician who defended the relation between the sexual complement (women 
as wives and mothers, and men as family protectors) and preservation of 
Islamic values (especially as regards religion and law). This discourse 
disapproved of sexual equality because it did not appear to be incorporated in 
the Koranic text (Aixelà 2000, 2006). In any case, the 2004 reform of the 
Mudawana gave women more extensive legal rights based on sexual co-
responsibility10. This was a success for the historical feminine and feminist 
associationisms.  
At the same time, analysis of the amendments being made nowadays to the 
                                                          
9 Aixelà (2002a). 
10 However, it must be said that some problems have arisen in the application of the new law 
because the judges sometimes construe it conservatively and do not apply the amendments. 
This question was brought up by various intellectuals and politicians in the meeting “Femme et 
future” organized by Al-Andalus Centre of Martil in April 2006, in which Latifa Benani (Istiqlal 
Party), Mohamed Sasi (Unified Socialist Party) and Basima Hakkaoui (Justice and Development 
Party) participated. Regarding the treatment of women in Islamic law, Z. Yamani (2002) and 





Family Codes by the different Arab-Muslim countries is of great interest, 
because they can be understood in two ways:  
- as the decline of a gender construction based on Islamic parameters 
(Moors 1999), or 
-  as the dissociation of women from the affirmation of a collective Arab-
Muslim identity (Aixelà 2006). 
 
Amazighs and social visibility 
Some characteristics of Amazigh people 
The Amazighs (Berbers) are an ethnic group originating from North Africa. In 
Morocco there are around 12 million Amazighs11. The cultural distance between 
Arabs and Amazighs is not so very great12. Basically it could be said to be 
centered on questions of linguistics, law, gender and space13. 
The linguistic diversity of Amazighs is notable, which makes standardization 
of the language difficult. Tamazight is a language of Camitic Semitic origin, 
which has never been written down systematically but transmitted orally. 
Nonetheless, there is proof of the existence of this language in the form of 
Tifinagh writing dating back approximately 6.000 years. Today the different 
dialects spoken in the Amazigh area include Tarifit, Tashelhit, Kabyle, Chaoui, 
Mozabi and Tuareg (Aixelà and Giralt, 2005). 
The Amazigh common law, urf, was transmitted orally from generation to 
generation and perpetuated in most of the tribes. It was a kind of justice 
imparted by the jama’a or tribal assembly represented by a group of men, 
usually elders. This local legislative body, which varied within the Amazigh 
groups of the same country, coexisted with the fiqh or Islamic Law in the 
Amazigh social system until the legal homogenisation carried out by the 
independent state in the middle of the 20th century. 
                                                          
11 There are almost 20 million Amazighs in North Africa and the territory they occupy embraces 
Egypt to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the borders of Sub-Saharan Africa. For more 
information, see Aixelà and Giralt (2005). 
12 More information on this relation may be found in the book by Gellner and Micaud (1973). 
13 This paper rejected other bases used to explain the difference between Arabs and Amazighs 
such as religion (the differentiation between orthodox and heterodox Islam) or politics (bilas as-





The Amazigh gender share similarities with the Arab gender, since, in both, 
the priority activities for women are marriage and motherhood. Nevertheless, 
Amazigh women have greater social visibility and greater mobility outside the 
domestic sphere. This difference is less when Amazigh women migrate to 
urban areas: there they are more restricted due to the public space and make 
us of the veil (hijab) as a means of going unnoticed. As Mernissi explained 
(1975:122-123): "...this phenomenon [the voluntary use of the veil by Amazigh 
women] may be easily understood if one remembers that for women from a 
rural society who are newcomers to a town, the veil is a sign of mobility, the 
expression of their new status as town dwellers". 
Finally, it should be mentioned that most Moroccan Amazighs lived in the Rif, 
the Middle Atlas, the High Atlas, the Anti-Atlas and Sous, while the cities were 
occupied basically by Arabs (Rosen, 1984). The migration that took place after 
Independence14 has meant that nowadays there is a high degree of co-
existence of the two ethnic groups in towns and cities15.  
 
The Arabization process: the homogenization of the Amazigh in the 
postcolonial period 
After Independence in 1956, the national identity of Morocco was founded in 
the Arabic identity and in Islam. The preamble to the Moroccan Constitution of 4 
September 1992 states that "Le Royaume du Maroc, Etat musulman souverain, 
dont la langue officielle est l'arabe, constitue une partie du Grand Maghreb 
Arabe". 
The politics of the government propitiated a cultural homogenization that 
affected the Amazigh group. It was a process whose objective was to reduce, 
and if this was not possible disregard, the cultural differences between the 
major groups, Arabs and Amazighs. This Arabization was also possible 
because the percentage of Amazigh population in Morocco was less than that 
                                                          
14 A specific example of Amazigh migrations in the postcolonial period is that of Sefrou where, 
in 1960, 56.2% of the population were Muslims who had been born in the city. In 1971, the 
percentage had fallen to 52.8%, of which over half were Amazighs from the Middle Atlas and 
the Rif (Rosen, 1984:15). 
15 Chaker (1989) denounced the systematic invisibility of the Berbers in Maghrebian towns and 





of the Arab population: in the late 1950s it was almost 35%, a figure that did not 
change until the late 1990s (33%) according to official data.  
This Arabization was carried out in different ways. First, the urf was 
eliminated from social practice. When Morocco gained its Independence, the 
State approved a Family Code, the Mudawana, inspired by Arab-Muslim 
sources (Koran and fiqh), that would replace the Amazigh common law that 
Amazigh people used in the past. The changes that this new legislation 
imposed on the Amazighs were, for example, that the polyginous marriage was 
envisaged (originally they were monogamous) and that women were denied 
certain grounds for divorce (for example, incompatibility)16. Second, the State 
imposed the Arabic language, which was used in all public spheres 
(administration, media, etc.), as the official language throughout the country, 
and forbade the use of any of the three Amazigh languages: Tarifit, Tamazight, 
and Tashilhit. Third, schooling was carried out in Arabic, not in Amazigh. In fact, 
as was explained by F. Valderrama (1948a, 1948b), access to schooling, even 
before colonial occupation, was limited to those who started Islamic studies. 
This consisted in teaching basic literacy based on memorising the Koran in 
classic Arabic (fusha), without considering whether the students were Arabs or 
Amazighs and whether they understood what they were learning. The invisibility 
of the Amazigh tongue in education continued throughout the 20th century. 
The result of the cultural homogenization was that the postcolonial Moroccan 
state rejected the possibility of constructing a nation-state capable of integrating 
the ethnical diversity, and thus missed an historical opportunity to integrate all 
the population in a common social project. 
This social map of the position of Amazigh culture in the Moroccan State 
allows us to see religious Islam as the true axis on which a more global 
Moroccan identity was constructed17. Islam “solved” the difficult problem of the 
recognition of “others”, the Amazighs: it is the main source of social cohesion in 
Moroccan society18. 
                                                          
16 Berque (1978:342-343). 
17 For information on the religions professed by Moroccan youth, see El Ayadi (2000). 
18 For Rosen (1984:26), the cultural differences between Arabs and Amazighs are less 





 Amazigh associationism nowadays: Amazighs and their political visibility 
In the last five years, the Amazigh vindication has taken on great significance 
in some Maghreb countries, especially Morocco and Algeria. The term 
“Amazigh” is being used to express their social vindications and try to 
consolidate a “pan-Amazigh” identity, with historical, cultural and linguistic basis 
throughout North Africa.  
The elements that gave rise to the Amazigh vindications are diverse but the 
most relevant reasons are probably the State's attitude forcing the Arabization 
of Morocco, relegating the Amazigh language and culture to territory outside the 
kingdom, and denying Amazighs their visibility in the social sphere (Chaker, 
1998; Goodman, 2004; Aixelà, 2002a)19. The rebound effect has been the 
revitalization of Amazigh self-consciousness that favored the emergence of 
numerous Amazigh associations20 within and outside the Maghreb frontiers. 
Algeria showed a relevant dynamism more notorious than the Moroccan in the 
80s and 90s.  
The external influence, especially of associations that are established in 
foreign countries, is important. Kastoryano (2000:307-8) pointed out that: 
“International migration has given rise to emerging communities which may be 
described as ‘transnational’. This term refers to communities made up of 
individuals or groups, settled in different national societies, sharing common 
interests and references –territorial, religious, linguistic- and using transnational 
networks to consolidate solidarity beyond national boundaries (Faist, 1998). 
The emergence of transnational communities is a ‘global phenomenon’, 
principally concerning post-colonial immigration. Immigrants are involved in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
between Berbers and Arabs and that, as both analytic and indigenous categories, these 
distinctions make sense predominantly as linguistic categories since the customs and practices 
of each overlap and intertwine greatly". 
19 There were different social tensions in Morocco and Algeria with Amazigh people between 
April and May 2001 that could be explained by the attitude in the postcolonial period of ignoring 
them. But the tensions on this matter are recent. The social invisibility of Amazigh people was 
not problematic in the past. K. Brown (1976:5) described the peaceful coexistence of Muslims 
and Jews, Arabs and Berbers in his study on the city of Salé: "the city acted as a focal point of 
integration. Even when ethnic identities began to assume some importance with the increased 
immigration that followed the establishment of the protectorate, social fragmentation and conflict 
remained minimal". 





networks based on economic interests, cultural exchanges, social relations and 
political affiliations. Their actions are de-territorialized...”. At the same time, 
other external support received should be mentioned such as, on the one hand, 
that given by the European and especially the French press, with examples 
such as Le Monde or the France-Press Agency, and on the other, the support 
of human rights associations such as Amnesty International or the International 
League of Human Rights21.  
Finally, new voices demanded a revision of the percentage of the Amazigh 
population, thinking that a higher percentage22 could legimitze two vindications:  
protection of the Amazigh language and culture, and reconstruction of the 
national identity using both ethnic identities, Arab and Amazigh.  
All this led Morocco to initiate recently a new policy on Amazigh culture. It 
was a surprising change in the treatment given by the Moroccan state to the 
Amazigh specificity: King Mohamed VI reconsidered the question and decided 
to give more social visibility to this ethnic group. The government has 
implemented resources and has opened different lines of action. The most 
interesting ones are schooling in Amazigh in 367 schools23 and the creation of 
the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe (IRCAM) directed by Ahmed 
Boukouss. Although this institution may counteract the associative vitality of the 
Amazighs and even neutralize it, at the moment, it is doing some interesting 
work on the recuperation and promotion of Amazigh culture. It is possible that 
the policies activated by the Moroccan state will try to control the Amazigh 
movement, but it seems that consolidation of the Amazigh identity cannot be 
stopped, due in part to the Algerian influence, and also to the support received 
from transnational communities established in Europe. Kastoryano (2000:307-
8) gave us a frame: The emergence of transnational communities is also a post-
national phenomenon… It is the chosen identity –linguistic, religious, regional- 
that constitutes a basis for transnational organization. Transnational 
organization allows the immigrant populations to escape national policies, and 
                                                          
21 Goodman (2004:76). Also Kich (2004). 
22 For Chaker (1980:9-10), the percentage of Moroccan Amazigh population was 40%, probably 
50% in the 1980s. 





generates a new space of socialization for immigrants involved in building 
networks beyond national borders (Appadurai 1996, Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 
Hannerz 1996). The cultural and political specificities of national societies (host 
and home) are combined with emerging multilevel and multinational activities in 
a new space beyond territorially delimited nation-states, inevitably questioning 
the link between territory and nation-state”. 
 
Conclusions: the vitality of sexual and ethnic associationism and 
achievement of social objectives 
The objective of this paper was to show the dynamism of associationism in 
Moroccan societies. As we have seen, this associationism has amalgamated 
two of the most important social vindications of the population, the sexual and 
the ethnical, and has obtained clear results in Mohamed VI's reign. 
In this success, the associative vitality of the postcolonial period, the influence 
of other Maghrebian networks and of the small social networks established in 
Europe, as well as the international pressure exerted by different organizations 
have all played a fundamental role. 
However, we should also mention other factors that also contributed to the new 
position adopted by the Moroccan monarchy and government towards these 
vindications (changing the Mudawana or making the Amazigh collective more 
visible): international politics, the relation between terrorism and Islamism and 
the image of Islam in foreign countries. It seems that Morocco wants to present 
itself as a society capable of being Muslim, while at the same time respecting 
both women's rights and “minority” rights. However, there is no doubt that 
associationism has played an important role in the achievement of these goals. 
 
Listing of Moroccan Associations 
Feminine and Feminist Associations in Morocco, 2007 (Selection) 
Action Femmes Juristes 
AFZA pour le Dévelopement, l’Environnement et le Culture 
Agrd ntqudar 









Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc 
Association de la Renaissance Féminine 
Association des Femmes de Carrières Juridiques 
Association Marocaine des Femmes Progressistes 
Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes 
Association Marocaine de Planification Familiare 
Association Marocaine pour la Promotion de l’Entreprise Féminine 
Association Solidarité Féminine 
Collectif Marocaine des Journalistes Professionnelles 
Fédération des Femmes de Carrières Libérales et Commerciales 
Ligue Démocratique des Drotis fe la Femme 
Ligue Nationale des Femmes Fonctionnaires dans le Secteur Public et le 
Secteur Prové 
Secteur Féminine de Al-Adl Wa-l-Ihsan 
Union de l’Action Féminin 
Union Nationale des Femmes Marocaines 
 
Amazigh Associations in Morocco, 2007 (Selection) 
 Tafsut Association 
 Recherche Culturelle et Educatif Association 
 Aourir Association 
Tiwitza tagadirt aabadu Association  
 Culturelle Azekka Association 
 Tamesna Association 
 Culturelle Sous Association 
Tizi Association  
Bouya Association  
 Culturelle Nokour Association  
Numidia Association  
Tidukla Association  
Asafar Association  
 Culturelle Asirem Association 
Toudert Association  
Tilelli Association  
 Fazaz Association 
Culturelle Asenflul Association  
Asid Association  
Tamount Association  
Tanukra Association  
AMEJ Association  
Al hiwar attakafi Association  





In Umazigh Association  
 Izuran Association 
  Azmez Association 
Yugurtha Association  
 Izuran n Tamunt Association 
AMREC Association  
Tamaynut Association  
Masinissa Association  
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